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The Demise of "Green" Protectionism: The
WTO Decision on the US Gasoline Rule.
JENNIFER SCHULTZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1996, the World Trade Organization (WTO)' Dis-
pute Settlement Body (DSB) delivered its first ruling since coming into
existence on January 1, 1995.2 The DSB ruling addressed complaints
by Venezuela and Brazil against United States environmental restric-
tions on gasoline imports.3 The DSB concluded that the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's (EPA) regulation governing imported gasoline
was inconsistent with WTO obligations. Commentators hailed the
decision as a triumph for the developing South against the developed
North' and as a death knell for tough U.S. environmental laws.' The
decision reignites a long-standing debate over the compatibility of
national sovereignty and free trade.6
* Lecturer in Law, Monash University, Australia. BA and LLB from Monash
University. LLM from University of Michigan.
1. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, [here-
inafter WTO Agreement or WTO], Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1144 (1994) [hereinafter Results of the Uruguay Round].
2. The Dispute Settlement Body administers the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
process. The scope of its responsibility and the new Dispute Settlement rules of the
GATT/WTO system are outlined in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, WTO Agreement, reprint-
ed in 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. Pursuant to Art. IM(3) of the WTO
Agreement, the WTO administers the DSU. When the WTO General Council meets
to discharge its duties under Art. IV(3), it convenes as the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at 1145. The DSB inherited most of the func-
tions formerly exercised by the Contracting Parties to the WTO Agreement. The
Contracting Parties are now referred to as members of the WTO Agreement.
3. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States-Standards for Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) [hereinafter Gaso-
line Panel Report].
4. See Humberto Marquez, Trade-Commodities: South Triumphs in WTO's First
Flight, INTL PRESS SERV., Jan. 19, 1996.
5. Evelyn Iritani, First WTO Ruling Provides Grist for Opponents Citing Threat
to U.S. Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1996, at D-1.
6. Dole Calls for Passage of Bill to Set Up WTO Review Commission, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 748 (May 8, 1996); see also Finlay Lewis, Hunter
Wants U.S. Out of WTO, Hits Ruling on Gasoline Imports, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
Jan. 25, 1996, at C-3.
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On April 29, 1996, the WTO's Appellate Body7 (Appellate Body)
affirmed the DSB's ruling regarding the gasoline regulation; however,
it reversed the DSB panel finding that would have limited the scope of
an exception for measures on conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources .
8
The gasoline dispute dealt with a U.S. environmental regulation
enacted to facilitate U.S. environmental clean air policy and aimed at
reducing a variety of smog causing contaminants in gasoline.9 The
regulation results in disparate treatment of foreign gasoline producers.
The regulation is facially discriminatory and its purpose appears pro-
tectionist. The regulation appears to have been a political response to
the pressure applied by an influential lobby group. American gasoline
refiners argued in support of the regulation. The refiners contended
that U.S. air pollution regulations imposed significant costs which they
were forced to absorb, giving foreign producers, faced with less strin-
gent environmental regulations outside the United States, a competi-
tive advantage. The regulation allowed foreign refiners to sell their
'dirty' fuel cheaply in the United States."0
The purpose of this article is to evaluate this first ruling of the
new WTO Appellate Body from a trade/environment perspective. The
gasoline decision demonstrates the recurring tension between domestic
environmental policies and the international trade regime." The reg-
ulation increased the costs of importing a product into the U.S. mar-
ket, effecting non-tariff barriers to trade. The decision reinforces the
tension between environmentalists concerned about the GATT/WTO"2
7. One of the most striking features of the WTO settlement system is the cre-
ation of the appellate review body which conducts legal reviews of panel decisions.
DSU, supra note 2, art. 17. The body is to be a standing organ, comprised of 7
persons appointed by the DSB for staggered 4 year terms. Id. art. 17, para. 1-2.
Cases are to be heard by 3 of the 7 members, selected on rotation without reference
to nationality or the wishes of the party. Id. art. 17, para. 1-3. As a general rule,
the appeal proceedings should not exceed 60 days from the date of notification of
the appeal to the circulation of the appellate report. Id. art. 17, para. 5.
8. Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) [hereinafter the Appel-
late Body Report].
9. Signed into law as Clean Air Act, Amendments, P.L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
10. DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GArr: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE Fu-
TURE 270 (1994).
11. The most significant case dealing with the trade/environment conflict is the
well published Tuna Dolphin decision, which determined that U.S. import re-
strictions on tuna to protect dolphins from incidental kill during purse seine fishing
operations violated the GATT. See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin Report] (dis-
cussed at the GATT Council meetings on Feb. 18, Mar. 18, and Apr. 18, but not yet
adopted by the Council).
12. The GATT/WTO will refer to the World Trade Organization and associated
agreements which are contained under the Results of the Uruguay Round. Results of
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fate of important environmental laws and trade advocates who gener-
ally view decisions such as this and the Tuna Dolphin case"3 as logi-
cal applications of the GATT rules against protectionism. Those in-
volved in trade policy focus on the potential protectionism disguised as
environmental action or protectionism in "green disguise." At the heart
of the trade and environment debate is a fear that flexible loopholes,
created under the banner of the environment, will deprive the GATT
nondiscrimination principles of all meaning.
Part II of this article examines the conflict between international
trade and the environment and reviews the debate prior to the gaso-
line dispute. Part III outlines the GATT approach to environmental
regulations and discusses some past Panel decisions which examined
environmental provisions. Part IV reviews the Gasoline Panel Report
and the Appellate Body decision in detail. Part V evaluates the impact
of the Gasoline decision and considers options for the United States.
Part VI concludes the article urging WTO Members to continually
assess the relationship between trade regulation and the environment,
so that only those measures that are truly operating as 'green' protec-
tionism are found to be inconsistent with the GATT.
II. THE CONFLICT
The potential conflict between trade rules and environmental
rules has captured significant international attention. Many articles
and books provide a detailed analysis of the elements of this con-
flict.14 The interrelationship between trade and the environment is a
critical issue also addressed in the negotiation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)"5 and in the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations."6
the Uruguay Round, supra note 1. The GATT refers to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1950)
[hereinafter GATT]. The GATT also refers to the institutional framework which im-
plemented the General Agreement prior to the establishment of the WTO.
13. Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., ESTY, supra note 10; The Greening of World Trade Issues (Kym
Anderson et al. eds., 1992); Steve Charnovitz, GATT and the Environment: Examin-
ing the Issues, 4 INTL. ENVTL. AFF. 203 (1992); Robert F. Housman & Durwood J.
Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Deci-
sion, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 268 (1992); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and
Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227
(1992); Peter L. Lallas et al., Environmental Protection and International Trade:
Toward Mutually Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 271
(1992); Eliza Patterson, GATT and the Environment: Rules Changes to Minimize
Adverse Trade and Environmental Effects, 26 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 99 (1992).
15. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
16. Because the relationship between trade and the environment was such a
critical issue at the meeting for the signing of the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at Marrakesh between
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The proliferation of national and international environmental
laws and the increased complexity of international trade policies re-
sults in a greater potential conflict between these two policy areas.
Trade policy now deals with the indirect effects on trade of domestic
policies such as those dealing with the environment. Environmental
regulations impose non-tariff barriers to trade by increasing the com-
plexity and diversity of product standards exporters must satisfy in
order to trade in certain markets. Exacting pollution control require-
ments increase domestic production costs, reducing international com-
petitiveness. These constraints lead to lobbying by domestic producers
for trade remedies against imports produced under less stringent stan-
dards. Conversely, escalated trade levels increase use and degradation
of resources in production and in transportation, aggravating environ-
mental concerns. Environmental production standards lowered to facil-
itate trade and international competitiveness add to these concerns.
The GATT and now the new GATT/WTO, as the most prominent
institution dealing with free trade, is increasingly forced to deal with
this interrelationship between trade and the environment. Consequent-
ly, the GATT has come under severe criticism as an anti- environmen-
tal organization because it dictates whether an environmental regula-
tion is GATT consistent. The more frequent outcome of GATT review is
decisions against environmental measures. 7
Despite the potential for conflict, it is clear that each policy area
has legitimate and worthwhile objectives. Environmental protection is
essential to human survival and the maintenance of the planet's natu-
ral resources."8 While trade is not essential in itself, free trade war-
April 12 and 15, 1994, the Members of GATT agreed to establish a Committee on
Trade and the Environment under the auspices of the WTO to examine the matter.
See Jennifer Schultz, The GATTIWTO Committee on Trade and the Environment-
Toward Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INTL L. 423, 438 (1995), for a discussion
of the issues that need to be examined by the Commission and the environmental
issues involved in the Uruguay Round.
17. See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INTL L.J. 459, 468 (1994), arguing that "the supervisory func-
tion of the GATT is controversial because its influence on environmental policy can
only be negative.' He perceptively points out that because the GATT has no rules to
regulate the environment, the most positive recommendation that can ever be made
is that the environmental measure in question does not contravene GATT.
18. John Stuart Mill, more than 100 years ago, recognized the legitimacy of
government intervention in environmental matters when he said:
Is there not the Earth itself, its forests and waters, above and below
the surface? These are the inheritance of the human race . . . . What
rights, and under what conditions, a person shall be allowed to exercise
over any portion of this common inheritance cannot be left undecided.
No function of government is less optimal than the regulation of these
things, or more completely involved in a civilized society.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1982)(1859). The challenge for governments is
to mesh the best environmental management with market incentives to produce the
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rants protection because of its crucial role in creating economic wealth.
Trade allows countries to increase production and consumption and
hence economic welfare. For developing countries in particular, eco-
nomic growth through trade is essential to ease poverty and its associ-
ated problems, which can include environmental damage.
Conflicts also arise from the imposition of trade restrictions for
environmental reasons. The GATT represents a negotiated balance of
reciprocal trade rights and obligations that is easily upset when trade
restrictions are implemented to achieve national social objectives. This
imbalance leads to international friction and claims for compensa-
tion.19 Unilateral trade action supporting the environment upsets this
negotiated balance and inevitably creates animosity that leads to con-
flicts. The GATT/WTO is concerned with only preventing disguised
discrimination or 'green' protectionism, not preventing environmental
regulation. Any environmental law ° that applies equally to imports
and domestic products and does not discriminate between different
trading partners, should in theory, be consistent with the principles of
the GATT.
III. THE GATT APPROACH
The most familiar context in which environmental laws are chal-
lenged is based on the application of GATT Articles III,21 XI,22 and
XX. 2s Environmental regulations which affect imports may violate
kind of environmental regulation that John Stuart Mill philosophically embraced.
19. Under the GATT, Article XXIII(1), a contracting party can complain and seek
a remedy if it considers that "[alny benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under
this Agreement is being nullified or impaired ... is the result of ... (b) the
application of another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of this Agreement . . . ." GATT, supra note 12, at A-64.
20. Except a quantitative restriction that violates GATT, Article XI. See infra
note 22.
21. GATT, Article III is the "national treatment" clause which prohibits discrim-
ination against goods once they are across the border. GATT, supra note 12, at A-
18.
22. GATT, Article XI imposes a general prohibition on quantitative measures
such as quotas and embargoes. Id. at A-32. Article XI embodies one the fundamental
principles of GATT: if protection is accorded to domestic industry it should be
through tariffs and not through commercial measures.
23. GATT, Article XX(b) and (g) are considered as the environmental exceptions.
Article XX (b) and (g) states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
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Article III if they treat an import less favorably than a domestic prod-
uct. Quantitative limits on imports may violate Article IX. Whether a
GATT panel finds a violation depends upon the application of the envi-
ronmental exceptions in Article XX(b) and (g)." The preamble to Arti-
cle XX contains two tests on the motivation of the government impos-
ing the measure. Measures must not "constitute... arbitrary or unjus-
tifiable discrimination"25 nor a "disguised restriction on international
trade.""
Over the past ten years, several GATT Panels have found particu-
lar health, conservation, and environmental measures applied by a
GATT contracting party inconsistent with GATT Articles and not oth-
erwise justified under GATT Article XX The most significant panel
decisions, which appear to raise legitimate environmental concerns,
include the Herring and Salmon Panel,28 the Thai Cigarette Panel,2"
the Tuna Dolphin Panels° and the more recent CAFE Panel."' These
decisions illustrate the approach taken by GATT panels when environ-
mental legislation has a disparate impact on foreign producers. In
most of these cases the environmental exceptions were construed nar-
rowly and the environmental legislation was challenged as GATT ille-
gal.
In 1988, the Herring and Salmon Panel ruled on the conservation
exception in Article XX(g)."2 The Canadian ban on unprocessed her-
ring and salmon prevented U.S. fishermen from bringing certain fish
caught in Canadian waters directly back to the United States. The
23.12(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.
Id. at A-60-61.
24. GATT, Article XX does not explicitly mention the "environment;" however,
clauses (b) and (g) address environmental based trade measures. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substanc-
es, June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.), at 136 (1988) [hereinafter Superfund
Panel Report] (holding that the U.S. tax on petroleum was GATT illegal as a dis-
criminatory measure on its face); Canada-Import Distribution and Sale of Certain
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D.
(39th Supp.), at 27 (1993); United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (II), 33
I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin II] (this decision has not yet been
adopted by the GATT Council).
28. Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon,
Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) (1989) [hereinafter Herring and Salmon
Panel].
29. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
Nov. 7, 1990, GAIT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) (1991) [hereinafter Thai Cigarette Panel].
30. Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11.
31. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Taxes on Automobiles,
Oct. 11, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994) [hereinafter the CAFE Panel].
32. Herring and Salmon Panel, supra note 28, at 114-15.
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panel found the ban was inconsistent with Article XI:1. In examining
the Article XX(g) exemption, the panel held that the measure must be
"primarily aimed" at conservation in order to qualify as an exemp-
tion.3 The measure did not include comparable restrictions on domes-
tic consumption and production; thus, it could not satisfy the Article
XX(g) exemption.'
In 1991, the Thai Cigarette Panel examined Thailand's ban on the
importation of cigarettes.3 The ban was enacted to achieve Thailand's
health policy objectives to reduce smoking. The Panel found that the
practice of prohibiting the importation of foreign cigarettes while con-
tinuing the sale of domestic cigarettes was inconsistent with GATT
and not "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(b). " Moreover,
the bans were not the "least GATT inconsistent" measures available.
The Panel concluded that other nondiscriminatory controls on the
importation of cigarettes were available to achieve the health policy
goals such as labelling requirements, fiscal measures, anti-smoking
education, advertising bans, and bans on smoking in public places.
The Thai Cigarette Panel ruling raised some interesting issues
regarding the application of the GATT Panel process to environmental
regulations. The Panel imposed an onerous burden on any contracting
party attempting to defend its environmental measure by ruling that
Article XX(b) demands the least GATT inconsistent measure to achieve
the environmental goals. This test effectively forces the Panel to grade
the measure according to its GATT consistency. Inherent in the process
is the assumption that alternative measures are politically and practi-
cally capable of achieving the same environmental goals. After changes
made in the new DSU, a GATT panel without the expertise to deter-
mine these issues may now employ experts to assist the panel in mak-
ing determinations of this kind."
The Tuna Dolphin dispute 9 provides the most famous and emo-
tive example of a GATT Panel decision regarding an environmental
provision." In ruling that a U.S. import ban on tuna from Mexico was
inconsistent with GATT, the Panel examined the application of Articles
III, XI, XX(b) and (g). The Panel found that the United States embargo
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Thai Cigarette Panel, supra note 29.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Under the new DSU Expert Review, groups may be established to facilitate
the decision making process. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 13, para. 2.
39. Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11.
40. See Matthew H. Hurlock, Note, The GAT7T, U.S. Law and the Environment:
A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 2098 (1992), for a detailed discussion. See also Housman & Zaelke, supra
note 14.
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on Mexican tuna was a quantitative restriction inconsistent with Arti-
cle XI. The Panel concluded the United States ban discriminated
against "like" products based on their production process in violation of
GATT's Article III. Article III's national treatment requirement pre-
vents trade measures based on differences in production processes. The
Panel found that the U.S. ban did not fall within the Article XX(b) or
(g) exceptions, and that these exceptions could not be applied
extrajurisdictionally."1
The Tuna Dolphin dispute sparked a heated debate over the abili-
ty of the GATT to resolve environmental disputes, despite the fact that
Mexico did not attempt to have the Panel Report adopted by the GATT
Council. 2 The Panel's finding drew criticism for the GATTs contin-
ued narrow application of the Article XX exceptions, particularly for
limiting the environmental exceptions to products and for failing to
consider production processes.
The 1994 CAFE Panel considered a number of U.S. environmental
laws, including the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) stan-
dard" and the gas guzzler tax." The CAFE standard required auto-
mobile manufacturers to meet certain levels of overall fuel economy for
their entire fleet. The gas guzzler tax imposed a tax on individual car
sales that failed to meet certain mile per gallon requirements. The
European Community claimed these laws disproportionately affected
European made cars; thus, they constituted discrimination disguised
as environmentalism.4 5
The panel found the CAFE standard applied equally to foreign
and domestic producers, but violated Article III:4 because of its dis-
criminatory effect. The methodology to determine the fleet wide aver-
age mileage differed depending on the location of the manufacturer.
The separate foreign fleet accounting provision placed foreign cars at a
disadvantage due to their foreign origin. The Panel held that the en-
tire law was incompatible with the GATT. The Panel concluded the
provision failed the Article XX(g) test because the separation of auto-
mobile fleets by country of origin was not a conservation policy and
because the fleet averaging and separate fleet accounting provisions
were inextricably linked in the CAFE standard. 6
The European Community argued that while the gas guzzler tax
was facially neutral when applied, it was discriminatory in effect. Cer-
tain categories of vehicles, which happened to be the same class of
41. Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11, at 1620.
42. The decision, therefore, has only the weight of an unadopted Panel Report.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2002-2013 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. 103-272 § 7(b), July 5,
1994, 108 Stat. 1379.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (1994).
45. CAFE Panel, supra note 31.
46. See id.
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vehicles which were not exported by European auto makers, 7 were
exempt from the tax. The Panel found that the tax applied equally to
foreign and domestic automobiles such that it was consistent with
Article 111:2. Consequently, it did not consider the Article XX excep-
tions. 8
The European Commission blocked the adoption of the report by
the GATT Council claiming the report in relation to the gas guzzler
tax provided a loophole for protectionists who can now use environ-
mental regulations to discriminate against imported products. 9 How-
ever, the CAFE standard has subsequently been repealed in the Unit-
ed States.0
As the cases illustrate, environmental laws that discriminate
between domestic and foreign producers are likely to be challenged.
Moreover, most environmental legislation has been found to be incon-
sistent with GATT because the environmental exceptions apply only if
there is no "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."5 1
IV. THE GASOLINE RULE DISPUTE
The latest WTO Appellate Body decision, the Gasoline decision,
provides another example of a domestic environmental policy contra-
vening the GATT.52 The Gasoline decision is significant in that it is
the first decision under the new dispute settlement rules in the
GATT/WTO system and the first GATT Panel decision to be appealed.
The creation of the DSU makes significant changes to the GATT
dispute settlement framework. Under the new rules, unless a consen-
sus of the parties votes against the adoption of the Appellate Body's
report, the report is automatically adopted thirty days after circulation
to its Members.53 This reverses the previous GATT rule, which re-
quired a consensus to adopt a panel decision. The new rule limits the
parties' ability to block the adoption of panel decisions, as illustrated
in the CAFE Panel. This limitation may increase the potential for
47. For example, the tax did not apply equally to light trucks or vans. See id.
48. Id.
49. European Commission, 1995 Report on U.S. Barriers to Trade and Invest-
ment (May 1995) at 40. It has been argued that the CAFE Panel Report allowed a
deliberately protectionist measure to slip through the GATT system. See generally
Charles T. Haag, Comment, Legitimizing "Environmental" Legislation Under the
GATT in Light of the CAFE Panel Report: More Fuel for Protectionists?, 57 UNIV.
PITT. L. REV. 79 (1995).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2002-2013 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. 103-272 § 7(b), July 5,
1994, 108 Stat. 1379.
51. GATT, supra note 23, art. XX(b) and (g).
52. Appellate Body Report, supra note 8.
53. DSU, supra note 2, art. 17, para. 14. Panel reports are automatically
adopted unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to
appeal, or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt a report. Id. art. 16, para 4.
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direct conflicts between GATT/WTO obligations and environmental
protections. Although members can no longer block the adoption of
contentious panel reports, they are not obligated to implement the
results of the decision in domestic arenas."
The first WTO Appellate Body decision widens the divide between
North and South5 in trade negotiations and environmental regula-
tion. One theme of the trade and environment debate is the accusation
that the industrialized countries are practicing environmental imperi-
alism or colonialism. Developing countries argue that the use of trade
pressure enables them to effectively impose their environmental poli-
cies, thus denying the developing countries their sovereign right to
decide their own policies.
At the same time, differences in environmental standards, espe-
cially between developed economies in the North and developing econo-
mies of the South, may create "pollution havens" for firms and indus-
tries seeking less regulatory oversight. Differing environmental provi-
54. A taste of this has already been given by the United States legislation im-
plementing the Uruguay Round. The introduction of the Dole Bill illustrates that the
U.S. may not automatically accept all WTO panel decisions and could even threaten
to leave the WTO. See the U.S. Implementing legislation of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, H.R. DOC No. 103-316 at 3 (1994). In an agreement between the U.S.
Clinton Administration and Senator Robert Dole, provisions were made which may
force the U.S. to leave the WTO if too many adverse decisions are adopted against
it. The Agreement set up a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission which will
review all final WTO dispute settlement reports adverse to the United States to
determine whether the panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of the
Agreement. In this Agreement, the following text was adopted:
The Administration will support legislation next year to establish a
WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission .... It will review all
final WTO dispute settlement reports adverse to the United States to
determine whether the panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the
scope of the agreement. Following issuance of any affirmative determina-
tion by the Commission, any member of each House would be able to
introduce a joint resolution calling on the President to negotiate new
dispute settlement rules that would address and correct the problem
identified by the Commission. If there are three affirmative determina-
tions in any five year period, any member of each House may introduce
a joint resolution to disapprove U.S. participation in the WTO-and if the
resolution is enacted by Congress and signed by the President, the Unit-
ed States would commence withdrawal from the WTO Agreement. Our
goals here are straightforward: (1) to assure that the dispute settlement
process is accountable; (2) that it is a fair process; and (3) that it works
as we expect it to work. From the Administration's standpoint, we are
confident that the dispute settlement process will work fairly and that
the concerns expressed by many will not materialize. However, if panels
do exceed their authority, this proposal gives us a fail-safe device.
Documents Relating to the Clinton Administration's Agreement with Sen. Robert Dole
(R-Kan.) Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement, Issued by the White House, Nov.
23, 1994, 11 Intl Trade Rp. (BNA) No. 47, at 1865 (Nov. 30, 1994).
55. The North/South tension refers to the tension between developed and devel-
oping countries.
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sions may also induce domestic regulators to relax environmental pro-
tection requirements or enforcement, both to attract industries and to
prevent any disadvantage to domestic firms relative to competitors in
other countries.56 The Gasoline decision illustrates the importance of
prioritizing the interrelationship between trade and the environment
on the WTO agenda in order to decrease the tension of the debate.
A. The History of the Gasoline Dispute
This dispute involves a challenge to regulations promulgated un-
der the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments.57 The Clean Air Act re-
quires gasoline producers to "reformulate" the gasoline they sell in
major U.S. population centers in order to control auto emissions and
improve air quality in the most polluted areas of the U.S. The law
requires refiners of reformulated gasoline to reduce by 15% a variety of
smog causing products from their gasoline. Reformulated gasoline was
required to be 15% cleaner by 1995 than gasoline which was sold in
1990. 58
In December 1993, the U.S. EPA promulgated regulations under
the Clean Air Amendments59 for establishing 1990 baselines (the Gas-
oline Rule).' Pursuant to the regulations, U.S. refiners established
individual baselines for 1990 using actual data on their fuel composi-
tion or several alternative methodologies for reconstructing their fuel
composition. In contrast, importers were required to satisfy a statutory
baseline. The statutory baseline was calculated by taking the average
level of contaminants in the U.S. refining industry in 1990.61 The
Gasoline Rule allowed U.S. producers to measure their improvement
against the quality of reformulated gasoline that they actually pro-
duced in 1990, while foreign producers had to apply the statutory base-
line.
The EPA justified the disparate treatment of imports by conclud-
ing that rules governing U.S. refiners could not be applied to imports
56. See e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT, BACKGROUND PAPER,
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT:. CoNFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 64 (1992).
57. Signed into law as Clean Air Act, Amendments, P.L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
58. In addition, conventional gasoline emissions are also required to stay as they
were in 1990, so that there was no degradation of air quality outside the major
population centers.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (k) (1994).
60. The Rule devised by the EPA December 15, 1993, was formerly entitled
"Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline."
59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80) [hereinafter the Gasoline Rule].
61. If the importer was also a foreign refiner they were entitled to establish
their own individual baseline provided they imported at least 75 percent of the gaso-
line they produced at their refinery into the U.S. This was referred to as the 75%
rule. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3, at 278.
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without raising substantial concerns about foreign data availability,
enforcement problems, and environmental consequences. U.S. gasoline
refiners argued that without this safeguard, the new pollution control
requirements would increase domestic production costs, giving imports
a competitive advantage and a chance to sell their "dirty" fuel in the
United States. Venezuela claimed that the EPA regulations were fa-
cially discriminatory because importers were denied the opportunity to
establish individual baselines. In practice, this meant that imported
gasoline with certain parameter levels below the statutory baseline
could not be directly sold into the U.S. market; whereas, U.S. gasoline
with the same qualities could be freely sold in the U.S. market provid-
ed the gasoline satisfied the refiner's individual baseline.
Venezuela originally filed a complaint in 1994 under the dispute
settlement mechanism of the 1947 GATT. Venezuela claimed the EPA
regulations were inconsistent with the national treatment obligations.
The complaint was subsequently withdrawn as part of a negotiated
settlement. On March 23, 1994, the EPA offered to change the Gaso-
line Rule in exchange for Venezuela's promise to drop its complaint.
62
The details of this negotiated settlement evolved during secret meet-
ings between Venezuela and the EPA, the Energy Department and the
office of the U.S. Trade Representative.'
When Congress became aware of this deal, it blocked the proposed
rule change. Subsequently, Venezuela relodged its complaint in Janu-
ary 1995, this time before the WTO." Brazil joined the dispute a. a
complainant after the WTO DSB accepted Venezuela's request for a
dispute settlement panel.
62. See EPA Announces Fuel Plan for Venezuela; Threatened GATT Complaint is
Shelved, 11 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 504 ( Mar. 30, 1994).
63. See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27
CORNELL INVL L. J. 459, 521-522 (1994) (criticizing the Clinton Administration's
policy in this regard, and arguing that the administration had worked out an ar-
rangement with Venezuela whereby Venezuela agreed to a quota on gasoline imports
at the current level in exchange for dropping the GATT case, thereby demonstrating
evidence of the secretive and anti-democratic way that GATT rules can influence
environmental laws). See also Aubry D. Smith, Executive-Branch Rulemaking and
Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: A Proposal to Increase Public
Participation, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1996) (criticizing executive branch ac-
tions which are secrative and suggesting that there is a need for greater domestic
participation in such actions).
64. On 23 January 1995, Venezuela requested the United States to hold consul-
tations pursuant to GATT 1994, Article XXII(1) Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Article 14(1), and DSU, Article 4, regarding the December 15, 1993 rule is-
sued by the EPA titled "Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for Re-
formulated and Conventional Gasoline." After failing to reach a satisfactory settle-
ment, and upon the request of Venezuela, the DSB set up a panel 10 April 1995.
See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3.
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B. The Gasoline Panel Report
Venezuela and Brazil requested the Panel to find that the Gaso-
line Rule devised by the EPA was:
(a) contrary to the most-favored-nation provision of Article I and
the national treatment provisions of Article III: and 4 of GATT 1994;
(b) not covered by any of the exceptions under Article XX of GATT
1994; and
(c) contrary to Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT).
The United States denied these claims and set forth two argu-
ments. 1. The Gasoline Rule was justified under the exceptions con-
tained in Article XX, paragraphs (b), (d), and (g); and 2. The Gasoline
Rule did not come within the scope of Article 2 of the TBT Agreement.
The Panel rejected these arguments concluding that the baseline es-
tablishment methods contained in the Gasoline Rule were inconsistent
with Article III:4 and were not justified under paragraphs (b), (d), or
(g) of Article XX. The Panel recommended that the DSB request the
United States to change this part of the Gasoline Rule so that it con-
formed with its obligations under GATT.
C. The GATT's Article III
The Panel decision rested on the application of one of GATT's
central objectives, the principle of nondiscrimination,' in particular,
the national treatment principle derived primarily from Article III.
Venezuela and Brazil argued that the Gasoline Rule violated Article
III:4 by denying foreign refiners the possibility to establish an individ-
ual baseline. The Gasoline Rule accorded less favorable treatment
because it required imported gasoline to conform with the more strin-
gent statutory baseline; whereas, U.S. gasoline had only to comply
with each refiner's individual baseline. 7
Article III: of the GATT provides that internal taxes and other
charges, laws, regulations, and requirements that affect the sale or
65. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade April 15, 1994, Final Act Embody-
ing the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex IC,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316-2, at 1318 (1994) [hereinafter TBT]. The Panel did
not make a determination on the issue of whether the regulation violated the TBT,
as they had already decided that the EPA rule did not qualify for any of the excep-
tions in Article XX. As a consequence, the relationship between the TBT and the
GATT rules will have to be determined at a later date.
66. The first principle of non discrimination is the "most favoured nation obli-
gation" under Article I, which requires a member to provide all other members with
the most favourable treatment in trade that it provides to any country. See GATT,
supra note 23, art. I, at A-12.
67. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3.
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distribution of products should not be applied so as to afford protection
to domestic products.68 Those laws, regulations, and requirements are
also subject to a more stringent test under Article III:4, which provides
that imported products must be given treatment no less favorable than
that given to like domestic products. 9
The Article III test has two parts. First, it must be decided wheth-
er the products being differentiated between are "like products." If
products are not "like" then any differentiation will be consistent with
Article III. If they are "like," then differentiation can only be consistent
if it does not afford either protection to domestic production or less fa-
vorable treatment to imported products.
In the gasoline dispute, the Panel determined that chemically
identical imported and domestic gasoline are "like products" because
they have exactly the same physical characteristics, end-uses, tariff
classification, and are perfectly substitutable. Secondly, the Panel
determined that the imported products were treated less favorably
because their refineries did not have the possibility of establishing an
individual historical baseline. The Panel noted that domestic gasoline
benefited in general from the fact that the seller/refiner used an indi-
vidual baseline while the seller/refiner of imported gasoline did not.
This less favorable treatment is illustrated by the case of a batch of
imported gasoline which was chemically identical to a batch of domes-
tic gasoline that met its refiner's individual baseline, but not the statu-
tory baseline levels.
The U.S. argued that not all imported gasoline was disadvantaged
by the statutory baseline. The statutory baseline by the nature of its
calculation was an average of gasoline quality consumed in the U.S. in
1990; therefore, at least half of the domestically produced gasoline
68. Article III:l states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be exempt from internal
taxes and other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied
directly or indirectly to like products of national origin. Moreover, in
cases in which there is not substantial domestic production of like prod-
ucts of national origin, no contracting party shall apply new or in-
creased internal taxes on the products of the territioriesof other con-
tracting parties for the purpose of affording protection to the production
of directly competitive or substitutable products which are not similarly
taxed; and existing internal taxes of this kind shall be subject to similar
negotitation for their reduction or elimination.
69. Article III:4 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use ....
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would have a higher individual baseline than the statutory baseline.7"
The imports were given less favorable treatment relative to those do-
mestic producers whose baseline was below the average. The domestic
producers represented roughly half of the domestic production.
The Panel acknowledged the disparity, but concurred with the
reasoning of an earlier panel decision,71 that under Article III:4 less
favorable treatment of particular imported products in some instances
could not be balanced by more favorable treatment of other imported
products in other instances. The Panel, quoting an earlier Panel, stat-
ed "[t]he words 'treatment no less favorable' in paragraph 4 call for
effective equality of opportunities for imported products in respect of
applications of laws, regulations and requirements affecting the inter-
nal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use
of products."72 In this case, under the baseline establishment meth-
ods, some imported gasoline" was effectively prevented from benefit-
ing from as favorable sales conditions as those afforded to domestic
gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer of a product;
therefore, imported gasoline was treated less favorably than domestic
gasoline.
The U.S. also argued that there was a significant quantity of
domestic gasoline from new suppliers assigned the statutory base-
line.74 Relative to the "similarly situated" domestic producers, foreign
producers were treated no less favorably.75 According to the U.S., post
1990 domestic producers were given similar treatment to pre 1990
70. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3, at 281.
71. United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990). The Panel had found that:
[Tihe "no less favorable" treatment requirement of Article III:4 has to be
understood as applicable to each individual case of imported products.
The Panel rejected any notion of balancing more favourable treatment of
some imported products against less favourable treatment of other im-
ported products. If this notion were accepted, it would entitle a contract-
ing party to derogate from the no less favourable treatment obligations
in one case, or indeed in respect of one contracting party, on the ground
that it accords more favourable treatment in some other case, or to
another contracting party. Such an interpretation would lead to great
uncertainty about the conditions of competition between imported and
domestic products and thus defeat the purposes of Article III.
Id. para. 5.14.
72. Id. para. 5.11.
73. Note that the statutory baseline was calculated by averaging the level of
contaminants in the U.S. industry in 1990. Therefore, some refiners would have
individual baselines which were higher than the statutory baseline. When comparing
the requirements for foreign producers under the statutory baseline and U.S. refiners
with a high individual baseline, it would appear that the U.S. refiners were being
given a higher standard tWiachieve.
74. The new suppliers were U.S. suppliers that had started production after
1990 and therefore did not have 1990 data on which to base an individual baseline.
75. Gasoline Panel Report supra note 3, at 281.
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foreign producers due to their lack of data. The Panel rejected this
argument declaring that Article III:4 does not "allow less favorable
treatment dependent on the characteristics of the producer and the
nature of the data held by it."7" The Panel concluded the EPA rule
violated Article III:4. Consequently, the Panel did not examine the
complaint under Article III:.17
D. The GATT Article XX Exceptions
Unilateral environmental measures inconsistent with Article III
are GATT consistent if they fall within one of the Article XX excep-
tions, which are also defenses. The burden of showing that Article XX
applies belongs to the respondent state, 8 in this case the United
States. The protection the exceptions offer has historically been con-
strued as narrowly as possible within the meaning of the words. 9
This is reinforced by the preambular conditions that exceptions must
not " . . . [c]onstitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where the same conditions prevail," ° nor be
"[a] disguised restriction on international trade .... "81 In the Gaso-
line dispute the Panel considered Articles XX(b), (d), and (g).
76. Id. at 294. See also Steve Charnovitz, The WTO Panel Decision on U.S.
Clean Air Act Regulations, 13 INTOL TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 459 at 5, where
he argues that the Panel in relation to this point should simply have held that
national treatment "does not mean average treatment (which the EPA rule approxi-
mates). Nor does it mean treatment as favourable as some domestic subclass re-
ceives. National treatment means that the best treatment offered to domestic prod-
ucts must also be offered to foreign products."
77. The Panel did not find it necessary to examine the consistency of the Gaso-
line Rule with Article III:l, because it is a more general provision than Article III:4
and as such the Gasoline Rule would be caught under this Article if caught under
Article III:4. See Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3. The panel followed the Malt
Beverages case which had examined a claim made under paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of
Article III and had concluded that "because Article III:1 is a more general provision
than either Article 111:2 or III:4, it would not be appropriate for the Panel to con-
sider Article III:1 allegations to the extent that the Panel were to find measures to
be inconsistent with the more specific provisions of Articles 111:2 and III:4." United
States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), at 270 (1993). The Panel did not proceed to examine the Gaso-
line Rule in relation to Article 1 as it considered that its findings on treatment
under the baseline establishment methods under Articles III:4 and XX(b), (d), and (g)
would, in any case, have made unnecessary the examination of the 75% rule under
Article 1:1. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3, at 296.
78. The result being that the U.S. must prove the absence of alternative mea-
sures that could meet its environmental objective.
79. See Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 11, para. 5.22.
80. Id.
81. GATT, supra note 23. See also Tuna Dolphin Panel, supra note 11, para. 4.8
and United States Imports on Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, May 23, 1986,
GATT, B.I.S.D. (30 Supp.) 107, paras. 54-56 (1984).
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E. Article XX(b) Exception
Article XX(b) sanctions the use of trade-restricting measures when
they are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health."'2 The Panel's examination of this article considered whether
the measure was intended to implement an enumerated policy. The
Panel agreed with the United States' that the pollution control policy
was a policy within the range of those enumerated in Article XX(b).
The remaining issue was whether the aspect of the Gasoline Rule
found inconsistent with the General Agreement was "necessary" to
achieve the stated policy objectives under Article XX(b). Necessary in
this context means "necessary ... only if there were no alternative
measures consistent with the [GATT], or less inconsistent with
it ... ."" which could reasonably be expected to be employed to
achieve the gas emissions policy objectives. After the Tuna Dolphin
Panel decision, the interpretation of the "necessary" test as the "least
GATT-inconsistent" measure available was widely criticized as being
too open-ended. Conceivably, any measure might have hypothetical
alternatives more consistent with the GATT. Despite these criticisms,
the Panel affirmed its interpretation.
The U.S. argued that there were no alternative measures avail-
able. The EPA had considered giving foreign refiners individualized
baselines, but had rejected this option because it did not have reliable
data to establish such baselines or to verify the refinery of origin for
imported gasoline. In the Panel's view, reasonably available alterna-
tive measures existed to achieve the environmental objective. The
Panel suggested giving all producers the statutory baseline or alterna-
tively giving foreign refiners individual baselines.'
F. Article XX(d) Exception
Article XX(d) provides that measures may be applied if necessary
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsis-
tent with the GATT.86 The Panel dismissed the United States' argu-
ments regarding Article XX(d). The United States argued that the
baseline establishment methods secured compliance with a law or
regulation that was not inconsistent with GATT. The Panel comment-
ed that the U.S. scheme might constitute a law or regulation for the
purposes of Article XX(d) "not inconsistent" with the GATT, assuming
82. GATT, supra note 23.
83. Venezuela and Brazil did not disagree with this point. See Gasoline Panel
Report, supra note 3, at 296.
84. Thai Cigarette Panel, supra note 29, para. 75.
85. See infra, part III. H. for a discussion regarding the feasibility of the alter-
native measures.
86. GATT, supra note 23.
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that a system of baselines by itself was consistent with Article III:4.
Nevertheless, the Panel found that sustained discrimination between
imported domestic gasoline contrary to Article III:4 did not "secure
compliance" with the baseline system. 7 The Panel emphasized that
the methods were not an enforcement mechanism," but were simply
rules for determining the individual baselines. As such, they were not
the type of measures contemplated by Article XX(d).
G. Article XX(g) Exception
Article XX(g) provides that measures may be taken "relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption."89 The Panel applied a three part analysis to deter-
mine whether the conservation exception applied. The analysis is set
forth below:
First, it had to be determined whether the policy in respect of
which these provisions were invoked fell within the range of poli-
cies to conserve exhaustible natural resources.
Second, it had to be determined whether the measure for which the
exception was being invoked-that is the particular trade measure
inconsistent with the obligations under the General Agree-
ment-was "related to" the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources, and whether it was made effective "in conjunction" with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Third, it had to be determined whether the measure was applied in
conformity with the requirements set out in the introductory clause
to Article XX, that the measure not be applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where the same conditions prevail or in a
manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade.°
The Panel acknowledged that clean air was a depletable natural re-
source and the policy to reduce the depletion of clean air clearly sat-
isfied the first part of the test. It was not prepared to conclude that the
measures in dispute "related to" the conservation of this resource. The
Panel adopted the Herring and Salmon Panel's9' interpretation of the
"related to" rule in which the measure had to be "primarily aimed" at
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as
"relating to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g). Similar-
ly, a trade measure was considered to be "made effective in conjunction
87. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3.
88. An example of an enforcement mechanism would be a fine.
89. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3.
90. Id.
91. Herring and Salmon Panel, supra note 28, at 114-15.
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with" production restrictions if it was "primarily aimed" at rendering
effective these restrictions.92
The Panel believed that the "precise aspects" of the EPA rule that
violated GATT Article III were not "primarily aimed" at the conserva-
tion of natural resources. According to the Panel, the United States
could reach the desired level of conservation of national resources
under the Gasoline Rule without being inconsistent with the national
treatment obligation. In light of this finding, the Panel did not find it
necessary to consider the third prong of the test."
H. The First GATTI WTO Appeal
The Panel's interpretation of Article XX(g) prompted the United
States' appeal, which was lodged on March 4, 1996. The U.S. claimed
the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article XX as a whole, and in
particular, that it erred by holding that the baseline establishment
rules were not justified under Article XX(g). The U.S. also claimed the
Panel misinterpreted whether the baseline establishment rules consti-
tuted a "measure" "relating to" the conservation of clean air within the
meaning of Article XX(g).
The issue on appeal was the narrowness of the Panel's interpreta-
tion of the wording in Article XX(g). Article XX states that it is the
"measures" which are to be examined under Article XX(g), not the
legal finding of "less favorable treatment."94 The U.S. contended the
panel looked at whether the "discrimination" in itself "relates to con-
servation" rather than at whether the "measure" relates to conserva-
tion. The Appellate Body agreed finding that the Panel referred to its
legal conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the "measure" in issue."
The Appellate Body also concluded that the baseline establishment
rules were "primarily aimed" at the conservation of natural resources
for the purposes of Article XX(g) and therefore satisfied the second
prong of the test. 6
92. Id.
93. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 3, at 295.
94. GATT, supra note 23.
95. Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, (stating that there is "no direct con-
nection between less favourable treatment of imported gasoline . . . and the U.S.
objective of improving air quality in the United States," Id. at 619 (emphasis added),
and concluding that the rules that afforded less favourable treatment were not pri-
marily aimed at the conservation of natural resources. Id.).
96. The Appellate Body also applied the "necessary" test, not only in examining
Article XX(b), but also in applying Article XX9g). Id. at 620. In applying these
words they found that the Panel had overlooked a fundamental rule of treaty inter-
pretation by failing to take into account the words actually used by Article XX(g).
Id. The Panel should have used the "relating to" test in (g), which has been inter-
preted by the Herring and Salmon Report as catching a measure that is "primarily
aimed at" conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Id. at 621-22.
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The Appellate Body considered next whether the rules met the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. It concluded that the rules
constituted "unjustified discrimination" and a "disguised restriction on
international trade." Although the rules were within the terms of Arti-
cle XX(g), they were not entitled to the justifying protection afforded
by Article XX as a whole. The numerous alternative courses of action
available to the U.S. in implementing the rules influenced the Appel-
late Body's conclusion. The alternative nondiscriminatory measures
identified, included the imposition of statutory baselines without differ-
entiation between domestic and imported gasoline. The environmental
downside, however, would be that gasoline of high quality could slip
down to the average standard in order to obtain a competitive advan-
tage, consequently affecting overall air pollution. The alternative en-
abled both foreign and domestic refiners to have individual baselines.
The problem with that option, apart from data difficulties, is that
foreign refiners with a low standard are able to sell their "dirtier" fuel
at a competitive advantage. "Clean" gasoline producers are required to
continue to produce gasoline which satisfied their high individual base-
line.
The Appellate Body did not assess the likely environmental im-
pact of these suggested options. Implicit in its decision is an as-
sumption that the alternative measures are capable of achieving the
same environmental goals in practical terms. This type of assumption
made by trade policy experts behind the closed doors of the Appellate
Body is troublesome. It leads environmentalists to question whether
GATT Panels and now Appellate Bodies, have the expertise or institu-
tional legitimacy to determine such an issue.
Speculation by the U.S. claim that administrative burdens would
accompany the alternative measures was viewed as insufficient to
justify the denial of individual baselines to foreign refiners. On this
issue, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel Report, suggesting
that the U.S. had not pursued the possibility of cooperation with the
governments of Venezuela and Brazil in order to mitigate potential
administrative problems.
The Appellate Body concluded that the discrimination was fore-
seen; therefore, the baseline establishment rules in their application
constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised restriction
on international trade."97 Thus, the Gasoline rule was outside the jus-
tifying protection afforded by Article XX as a whole.
97. Appellate Body Report, supra note 8.
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V. U.S. OPTIONS
For the United States, the Appellate decision will be seen by some
as a pyrrhic victory. The error of law related to Article XX(g) was cor-
rected, however, when the correct interpretation of the law was ap-
plied, the result was the same. The GATT exceptions for health and
environmental policies, which allow countries to pursue such policies
even if they lead to trade barriers, have been narrowly interpreted;
this case continues that practice.98 The legal conclusions of the Panel
and the Appellate Body were clearly correct in finding that the EPA
rule was in violation of Article III and that none of the Article III ex-
ceptions applied. The gasoline rule is an example of an environmental
regulation that was clearly discriminatory on its face. The rule pro-
vides a clear example of protectionism being disguised as an environ-
mental measure.
The Gasoline case, like the Tuna Dolphin, the Salmon Herring,
the Thai Cigarette, and the CAFE Panel decision, concerned an envi-
ronmental measure that operated as a nontariff trade barrier. In con-
trast to these previous decisions, in particular the Tuna Dolphin de-
cision, the Gasoline decision cannot be used by environmentalists to
bolster claims that the GATT is institutionally hostile to environmen-
tal protection. The decision provides a very lucid example of how envi-
ronmental measures can function as disguised non tariff barriers to
trade. It once again raises the conflict between environmental policies
which impose trade burdens and trade regulation under the GATT. It
is a clear case of "green" protectionism." For the environmental
movement, this is a poorly drafted regulation which undermines legiti-
mate attempts to protect the environment without unjustifiable dis-
crimination. It also undermines calls for the GATT/WTO to become
more environmentally sensitive. If environmental policies are more
carefully structured so that the burdens imposed on the domestic and
foreign markets are equal, then they will be less likely to be perceived
by the nations affected as unjustified and therefore should be able to
survive international scrutiny.
98. The Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress has noted that of
all dispute resolution panel reports from 1947 to 1990, nine involved the environ-
mental exceptions. Of the nine, two did not contain a ruling on their applicability,
six found that they did not apply, and only one found that they did. Thus, GATT
panel rulings offer little support for the argument that environmental measures
imposing trade burdens are subject to these exceptions. ESTY, supra note 10, at 49
n.9. See also PIERRE PESCATORE ET. AL., HANDBOOK OF GATT DIsPuTE SETILEMENT
(1991).
99. In terms of the result, it appears that the "right party ' was succesful in this
dispute because here the discriminatory measure could not be supported or justified
by any environmental arguments. The regulation did not encourage domestic produc-
ers with low baselines to improve the quality of their fuel. In that sense, the regula-
tion did not really support its environmental objectives of lowering air pollution.
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The Clinton Administration and other free trade supporters con-
tend that the economic stakes in this case are trivial and that the
administration has a number of options, none of which would compro-
mise the objectives of the clean air program. They argue that in the
long term, the WTO's role in settling trade disputes will work to
America's advantage far more often than the reverse." Under WTO
procedures, the U.S. has a degree of latitude in determining how to
conform with the Appellate Body ruling. One option is to simply ignore
the ruling, as the effect of Appellate Body decisions on U.S. law is the
same under the WTO as it was under GATT. Nothing in the DSU
authorizes the dispute settlement system to repeal U.S. laws. If the
U.S. disregarded the Appellate Body decision, Venezuela and Brazil
could impose sanctions such as punitive tariffs on U.S. goods, but only
to the extent of the damage inflicted on them by the EPA regulations.
The U.S. would be unlikely to take such a confrontational approach in
this instance.
When a country enters into any international agreement, it neces-
sarily relinquishes some measure of sovereignty. Therefore, the critical
question is not whether the U.S. is relinquishing sovereignty, but
whether the U.S. has inappropriately relinquished sovereignty in the
case of the WTO. Arguably, the sovereignty of the U.S. will be en-
hanced by the dispute resolution procedures because the U.S. will be
able to enforce legal rights more effectively. In addition, the U.S. re-
tains its right to withdraw from the WTO at any time. In fact, the
implementing legislation established a special panel to evaluate
whether the U.S. should withdraw from the WTO.' 1
The impact of the Appellate Body ruling does not constitute a
threat to the U.S. implementation of environmental provisions. The
ruling merely emphasizes that trade restrictive measures disguised as
protectionism will be found to be discriminatory. Criticism of the new
WTO and its DSU for such a stance is unjustified. The decision is not
a death warrant for tough U.S. environmental laws, nor a relinquish-
ment of U.S. sovereignty; however, it could be viewed as a small victo-
ry for the developing South. 2
100. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., supra note 6.
101. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
102. As Petersmann points out, the "[G]ATT dispute settlement proceedings offer
an effective means, at low transaction cost, for defending weaker countries against
unilateral power politics and for clarifying and adjudicating market access rights
under GATT law." Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and Interna-
tional Environmental Law, Prevention and Settlement of International Environmental
Disputes in GATT, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 43, 79 (1993).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Questions abound as to whether the GATT/WTO requires major
institutional changes to accommodate the "green agenda" and to
achieve a balanced relationship between trade and the environment.
As Geza Feketekuty noted, "[tihere is wide agreement among GATT
members that the GATT's trade rules need to be adapted to better
support the achievement of environmental goals at both the national
and global levels.""° At the meeting for the signing of the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations in Marrakesh in April 1994, the Members of the GATT
agreed to establish a Committee on Trade and the Environment under
the auspices of the WTO. The institutional structure, content, timeta-
ble, and mechanisms by which this environmental committee will carry
out its work will largely determine whether trade can become a more
effective agent of sustainable development."0 4 Matters to raise in this
fora include procedural reforms to facilitate the resolution of environ-
mental disputes.
The gasoline dispute gives rise to a number of procedural criti-
cisms. In particular, the Panel and Appellate Body were comprised
solely of trade specialists who did not appear to have environmental
expertise. In environmentally inspired disputes, it would be preferable
for a panel to call for the establishment of an expert review group' °
to facilitate fact finding and provide technical advise on certain aspects
of the dispute. Increased public participation and environmental exper-
tise in the dispute resolution process could go a long way towards
overcoming the gap between free trade advocates and environmental-
ists. The inclusion of experts with environmental knowledge in the
adjudicatory process would facilitate the resolution of interpretational
difficulties which occur due to the competing policy objectives between
trade and the environment. Environmental experts will be able to help
determine the appropriate principles to differentiate between accept-
able and unacceptable environmental measures. As outlined above, the
GATT does not prohibit environmental protection per se. The GATT is
concerned only with discriminatory measures which restrict trade.
The Gasoline decision illustrates that in relation to domestic envi-
ronmental laws, the GATT requires that these laws be non-discrimi-
natory or "necessary" for the protection of the environment or "related
to" conservation. The decision illustrates that domestic environmental
laws need to satisfy the GATT exceptions to be acceptable and it rein-
forces just how difficult it will be to satisfy these requirements, partic-
103. Geza Feketekuty, The Link between Trade and Environmental Policy, 2
MINN. J. GLoBAL TRADE 171, 199-200 (1993).
104. See Schultz, supra note 16.
105. DSU, supra note 2, art. 13, para 2.
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ularly the chapeau of Article XX. In applying the GATT exceptions,
Panelists and Appellate Body members are often required to make
technical and scientific rulings on questions of fact and interpretations
of law based on the imprecise and general tests of the Article XX provi-
sions.
In this instance, the GATT rules were applied in a manner in
which achieved the "right" result. The Gasoline rule illustrates a poor-
ly drafted, inefficient environmental regulation which could be charac-
terized as an attempt at 'green' protectionism. The EPA rule was clear-
ly facially discriminatory. In contrast to the situation afforded to do-
mestic producers the rule denied foreign gasoline producers the oppor-
tunity to establish individual baselines. While the environmental ob-
jective of reducing gasoline pollution is clearly commendable, the rule
made no attempt to deal with improving the quality of gasoline from
"dirty" domestic producers with a low individual baseline. It was en-
tirely appropriate for this regulation to be struck down by the new
WTO system." However, its fate should not be used by trade advo-
cates as an excuse to stop work on assessing the relationship between
trade and the environment. It is essential to the long term future of
this planet that only those environmental regulations that are truly
discriminatory are found to be GATT illegal.
106. As Petersmann perceptively pointed out in relation to the Tuna Dolphin
Report,
[elven if there were a need to formally amend the GATT on environ-
mental grounds-there is no convincing case for 'aggressive unilateralism'
and justified disobedience' so as to impose one's own national environ-
mental standards on another country by means of unilateral dis-
criminatory import restrictions. Self-righteous doctrines of 'creative
illegality', calling for breaches of GATT law as a means of improving
the law, and unilateral definitions of unfair trade are inconsistent with
a rule-orientated trading system and with the symmetry of reciprocal
GATT rights and obligations.
Petersmann, supra note 102, at 78.
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